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ELECTION LAW AS A SUBJECT-A
SUBJECTIVE ACCOUNT
Daniel H. Lowenstein*
Some time after Rick Hasen asked me to write a short essay on
election law as a field of study for the present symposium, the odd
fact occurred to me that this would be the third time I have written
about the subject of "subjects" in an election law context.
The first time was in an article on the California constitutional
provision limiting initiative proposals to a single subject.' I argued:
[W]hat constitutes a "subject" is a matter of choice based on
considerations of convenience, rather than some objective
demarcation of the human mind .... [A]ny combination of
concepts and things may appropriately be regarded as a
"subject" so long as there are people who find it expedient
to so classify them.
2
The second time was in the Introduction to my election law
casebook.3 There I argued that election law was late to be recog-
nized as a subject in American universities because it "falls at junc-
tures formed by other subjects," especially constitutional law in law
schools and public law and American politics in political science de-
partments. 4 Junctures are also peripheries. Nevertheless, I claimed,
election law was worth being treated as a subject in itself. For one
thing, election law had "become a growing subject in courtrooms,
legislative chambers and political headquarters. One consequence
[was] increased work for lawyers." 5 More generally, the study of
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject
Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983).
2. Id. at 938-39 (emphasis deleted).
3. See DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS,
xix, xix-xx (1995).
4. See id. at xix.
5. Id.
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basic democratic institutions seemed to me to be worthwhile, aside
from the immediate practicalities of professional preparation.
6
Certainly, election law is making progress as a law school sub-
ject. Around the time I began teaching the subject in the early 1980s,
American law reviews could and occasionally did run symposia on
subtopics of election law.7 Such events have become more common
in the '90s.8 A more significant indicator of election law's progress
as a recognized subject is that symposia on the subject as a whole
have begun to appear.9 Fifteen or twenty years ago, the idea of a
symposium on the subject of "election law as a subject" would have
seemed a joke too quirky even for one of my footnotes. That senior
and junior scholars of such stellar quality would have both the inter-
est and the background in the field to contribute to a symposium such
as the present one could not have been hoped.'0
I have no doubt that all this is to the good. Personally, it is grati-
fying to think that the articles I spend months writing might be read
and forgotten by a few dozen people rather than only by half a dozen.
6. The past few decades have seen the rise to prominence in political sci-
ence of the "New Institutionalism," an application of game theory that places
emphasis on rules and institutions as determinants of political outcomes. New
Institutionalists have paid more attention to legislatures and bureaucracies than
to elections. The political scientists who have done the most important work
on elections in the second half of the twentieth century have tended to be em-
piricists rather than theorists.
7. See, e.g., Symposia: Political Action Committees and Campaign Fi-
nance, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 351 (1980); Symposium: Gerrymandering and the
Courts, 33 UCLA L. REv. i (1985).
8. See, e.g., Symposium on the California Initiative Process, 31 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1161 (1998); The Legitimacy of Direct Democracy: Ballot Initiatives
and the Law, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y vii (1997); Symposium: Voting
Rights after Shaw v. Reno, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517 (1995); Symposium on Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126 (1994); Symposium on Com-
parative Political Expression and the First Amendment, 21 CAP. U. L. REV.
381 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Symposium: Law and the Political Process, 50 STAN. L. REV.
607 (1998); Voting Rights and Elections, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1; Sympo-
sium: Regulating the Electoral Process, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1409 (1993).
10. Furthermore, it would be easy to name an even greater number of ex-
cellent election law scholars who are not represented in this symposium. I
shall not do so, because I would be sure to forget someone. But if you are
reading this, you can rest assured that you are one of the people I am thinking
of.
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More broadly, the emergence of election law as a subject provides a
modest practical benefit to some law students and adds something
worthwhile to the intellectual life of law schools and political science
departments. Although the present occasion might therefore be a
good one for celebration or proselytization, I prefer to raise two
questions. Why has election law arisen as an academic field of study
during the past two decades? And why does it contain what it con-
tains?
Each of these questions has an obvious answer that has probably
already entered the reader's mind. Election law has arisen as an aca-
demic field of study because of the rapid growth of the law affecting
elections. The key events in that growth were the constitutionaliza-
tion by the Supreme Court of representation in the early 1960s; n the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act 12 in 1965 and its application by
the Supreme Court to systems of representation;13 and the enactment
of the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act 14 and
of comparable legislation in most of the states. The reason election
law as a field of study contains what it contains is that elections are
significant and highly stylized events in our political system. Peda-
gogy and scholarship relating to the various legal questions that sur-
round elections are thus naturally unified.
These answers are not only obvious, they also contain a great
deal of truth. But not the whole truth. Yes, tremendous growth in
election law has occurred in the last four decades, especially with re-
spect to representation, voting rights, rights of parties, and campaign
finance regulation. And yes, it is seemingly natural to group areas of
law relating to the institution of elections. But election law did not
begin with Baker in 1962, and the grouping of subjects that we think
of as constituting the field is far from inevitable.
Several years ago, when I had begun working in earnest on my
election law casebook, I used to tell people that I was working on the
first such book ever. Then, one day, browsing around in the UCLA
11. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973gg-9.
13. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
14. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55.
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law library, I chanced on a hefty, 781-page collection of American
election law cases published in 1871.15
The fact that two casebooks have been published in the last few
years after a hiatus that apparently lasted 124 years is an additional
indicator of the recent growth of election law as a field of study. 16 In
the appendix to this essay, I have listed the chapter titles in the two
current casebooks and the subject headings contained in the 1871
volume. Although there are significant differences in coverage be-
tween the two current casebooks, it is not surprising that these differ-
ences fade when each is compared with the 1871 subjects. To speak
loosely and perhaps imprecisely, many of the subjects in the 1871
volume have a nuts and bolts feel to them relative to what we cur-
rently regard as the more conceptually interesting subjects contained
in the current volumes.
Nuts and bolts questions of the sort raised in the 1871 cases
have not disappeared. To the contrary, they have increased in num-
ber, because of developments such as the state-provided ballot and
the direct primary. For the most part, we do not teach these issues
and we do not write about them in law reviews; not because they are
not there but because, for various reasons, we do not find them suffi-
ciently interesting.
The 1871 volume demonstrates that it is not true that there was
no body of election law to speak of before the 1960s. Nor is it true
that the content of our election law courses and election law scholar-
ship is naturally determined by the inclusion of all law relating to
elections. Rather, what began to happen in 1962 was that a substan-
tial body of election law arose that could interest contemporary law
school professors. There are two variables at work. One, to be sure,
is the subject itself. The other is the interests and styles of thinking
that prevail in the relevant parts of the university. A hundred years
or so ago, the combination of these variables drove election law to
the periphery. Over the last twenty years or so, the same combina-
tion has caused a small but growing number of us to bring that pe-
riphery into the center of our attention.
15. See FREDERICK C. BRIGHTLY, A COLLECTION OF LEADING CASES IN
THE LAW OF ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1871).
16. The second of the recent casebooks to appear is SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF
ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (1998).
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It follows that to explain the rise of election law as a subject and
the nature of its content, one must look not only at the fairly obvious
story of developments in the object of our attention but also the much
more complicated story of shifting interests and styles of thought
among legal academics. Since I have neither taste nor training to en-
gage in sociology, I shall eschew generalizations and describe a few
of the meandering pathways that led one legal academic-myself-
to develop a set of interests that I now combine under the label "elec-
tion law."
The story has a prologue.1 7 In the academic year 1965-66, I was
a second-year law student laboring away as a member of the Har-
vardLaw Review. It has been that journal's practice to assign five or
six second-year students to write a "Developments" Note, which is a
lengthy and comprehensive treatment of a much broader subject than
would be possible in a note written by a single student. In 1965-66,
with the ink still drying on Reynolds v. Sims, 18 the Developments
topic, naturally enough, was redistricting. 19 I was not assigned to the
Developments team. Although I was not especially enamored of the
topic the editors assigned to me,2 0 I well remember sitting around
that winter listening to my classmates jabbering on about redistrict-
ing, and thinking that but for the grace of God, I too would have been
mired for months in that dry and arcane subject.
21
The story proper begins some five years later when I went to
work as a staff attorney for the newly elected Secretary of State of
California, Jerry Brown. Brown made no secret of his plans to run
for governor in 1974. He wanted to make a record in office on
which he could run, and since the California Secretary of State had
very little power over anything, the most promising area for him ap-
peared to be election law reform. Although I was hired for that
17. It also has a moral, as those who persevere to the end will discover.
However, I am not claiming that the moral is worth the perseverance.
18. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
19. See Notes, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1226 (1966).
20. See Note, Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1435 (1966).
21. Shakespeare's Gloucester, had he been present and able to foresee the
future, probably would have observed that "As flies to wanton boys are we to
th' gods." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act IV, sc. i (Alfred Harbage
ed. 1969).
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purpose, the subject did not seem much less dry and abstract than it
had when I was a law student. My interest, after a couple of years of
suing the government as a legal services lawyer, was to see what life
was like on the other side of the fence, and also to attach myself to a
possibly rising political star.
By and large, my election law work focused on "political re-
form," a category I shall turn to in a moment, and easing of voter
registration. There were some exceptions, however, and one par-
ticularly intense one required me briefly and for the first time to
think about redistricting. In 1971, Democrats controlled both houses
of the California legislature and the governor was Republican Ronald
Reagan. At one point in 1971, it seemed that the two parties would
agree on redistricting plans that more or less satisfied all the legisla-
tive incumbents. However, a special election to fill a vacant Assem-
bly seat that had previously been held by a Democrat was won by a
Republican. The Democrats wanted to keep this as a Democratic
seat, whereas the Republicans wanted to alter the district for the
benefit of the new incumbent. On this issue the deal fell through and
the Democratic leadership, now unable to expect any Republican
votes, passed a plan more favorable to the Democrats. Governor
Reagan vetoed it.
22
The matter went to the California Supreme Court. The Secre-
tary of State needed the court to determine which districts were to be
used in the 1972 election, so that he could carry out certain adminis-
trative functions. So far as these functions were concerned, it did not
matter what the districts looked like. Brown nevertheless agreed
with two Democratic Assembly members23 that the brief he would
file with the court would go beyond a neutral request for districts and
22. This is my story, and I am telling it from memory. For a careful history
of redistricting in California over the past three decades, see Morgan Kousser,
Reapportionment Wars: Party, Race, and Redistricting in California, 1971-
1992, in RACE AND REDISTRICrING IN THE 1990S 134 (Bernard Grofinan, ed.,
1998). For the incident described in the text, see id, at 137-38.
23. They were Henry Waxman, then chairman of the Assembly Elections
and Reapportionment Committee, and Ken Cory, from Orange County.
Democrats elected from Orange County were scarce in those days, and if they
did not want to get scarcer, they tended to have an acute interest in redistrict-
ing.
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set forth a defense of the legislature's plan while arguing against al-
ternative plans being tendered by the Republicans.
I was given eight days to write a brief on a subject about which
my previous thinking had been confined to relief that I did not have
to think about it.24 The end product was 135 pages long. Many of
those pages consisted of a district-by-district defense of the legisla-
ture's Assembly, Senate, and Congressional plans, as well as criti-
cism of the Republican proposals.
The only reason I was able to write such a brief at all, much less
in such a short time, was that I had the assistance of two legislative
staff members, Michael Berman and Carl D'Agostino, who had an
encyclopedic knowledge of the state's political geography and of the
politics of the 1971 redistricting negotiations. I learned from them
not only the well-known but abstract fact that redistricting is an in-
tensely political activity, but also some of the rich and enormously
complex reality that underlies that abstraction. It was to be another
ten years before I would again be concerned with redistricting, but
the foundation of my thinking was laid during those eight days.
During my four years in the Secretary of State's office, our em-
phasis turned increasingly to "political reform," which to us meant
three main areas of regulation: campaign finance, lobbying, and con-
flict of interest. In 1972, a handful of legislative staffers and private
organizations began planning a coalition to support a political reform
initiative for the 1974 ballot. The Secretary of State's office was
consciously excluded from these efforts, presumably because of a
distrust of Brown's ambition or his style, or both. Later that year I
learned that the coalition had fallen apart, mainly due to disagree-
ments between its two core groups-the California branch of Com-
mon Cause and a now-defunct organization known as the People's
Lobby.
I invited representatives of both these groups to a meeting in the
Secretary of State's office and urged them to start again, but this time
with Brown as a third core member of the coalition.25 This may have
24. See Brief for Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Legislature v. Reinecke, 6 Cal. 3d
595, 492 P.2d 385, 99 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1972).
25. Bob Stem, another attorney working for Brown, worked closely with
me on this entire project. Of course, all our major actions were cleared with
Brown first.
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been a bitter pill for the two other groups, but to use parlance that
became common around that time, we made them an offer they could
not refuse. Our selling point with each group was that we could pro-
vide what the other group lacked for a successful initiative effort.
The People's Lobby had demonstrated an ability to gather large
numbers of signatures, but lacked technical expertise to draft a credi-
ble proposal. This would have been a particularly severe problem for
the People's Lobby had they gone forward on their own, for they had
previously sponsored an effort to recall Governor Reagan, as well as
an environmental initiative, both of which failed. A proposal spon-
sored solely by the People's Lobby would be greeted with skepticism
by the press and much of the public. However, we argued to Com-
mon Cause, if Brown joined with the People's Lobby to sponsor a
political reform initiative, we would be able to provide both the
drafting expertise and the credibility that the People's Lobby lacked.
On the other hand, if Common Cause proceeded alone, they
would have both technical expertise and credibility. What Common
Cause lacked were the expertise and resources for qualifying a meas-
ure for the ballot. We pointed-out to the People's Lobby that Brown
would be capable of raising significant resources for an initiative ef-
fort and, in common cause with Common Cause, could almost surely
qualify the measure.
The structure of the situation we happily fell into had three key
elements: First, neither the People's Lobby nor Common Cause
could be confident of succeeding with a political reform initiative on
its own. Second, it was likely that either of those organizations, if
allied with Brown, could succeed. Third, it would be disastrous for
either of these organizations if it was not a prominent part of the
leadership for any political reform effort that succeeded in Califor-
nia. Hence, the offer they could not refuse. The coalition was
formed.
I shall spare the reader the travails and tergiversations that fol-
lowed. The measure, drafted over roughly the first half of 1973,
contained three major sections: campaign finance disclosure, lob-
bying regulation, and conflict of interest regulation.26  It was
26. As a result of one of the most abrupt of all the tergiversations, campaign
spending limits, applicable only in statewide elections, were added at the last
minute. These limits fell in the wake of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
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approved by the voters as Proposition 9 during the 1974 primary
election and thus became the California Political Reform Act of 1974
(the "Act").
27
Most of the Act, including the creation of the Fair Political
Practices Commission ("FPPC") to administer it, went into effect the
day after Jerry Brown was inaugurated as governor in 1975.28 Al_
though I had no desire to be on the FPPC when we were drafting the
measure, or even when it was approved, I changed my mind during
the months between the election and the effective date.
The main reason for the change was that, during that period, I
was besieged with questions from large numbers of people who
would be subject to, or affected by, the Act. I was in no position to
give authoritative advice, but during the interim these people had
nowhere else to go. It became clear to me that the workability of this
measure that I had had.a hand in foisting on the state would be en-
hanced by an FPPC chair who was intimately familiar with its provi-
sions and background. In addition, I was attracted by the opportunity
to lead a start-up enterprise. For these reasons, and despite a reluc-
tance to continue working with the same substantive issues, I told
Brown that I would like to be appointed chairman of the FPPC. He
appointed me, and I served a full four-year term. I thus continued to
work in election law, as I began, for reasons unrelated to the subject
matter itself.
At the end of my term at the FPPC, in 1979, I joined the UCLA
law faculty. In the spring semester of my first year, I taught a course
entitled "Legislation," in which I attempted to integrate many of the
issues surrounding the Political Reform Act. Although the casebook
and never went into effect. See Citizens for Jobs and Energy v. Fair Political
Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547 P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976)
(striking down the California campaign spending limits).
27. See CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 81000-91015 (West 1993). The Act, which is
a highly imperfect piece of legislation, has been amended substantially since
1974. All the imperfections were caused by the amendments.
28. See CAL. GOv. CODE § 81016. The effective date of the Act was thus
delayed from June, when it was enacted, to January. I expected this section to
be raised as an issue during the campaign on Proposition 9, because it could
fairly be characterized as flagrantly partisan. Yet, I thought the political cost
was worth the possibility that Brown, rather than Reagan, would appoint two
members of the FPPC, including the chairman. To my surprise, the point was
never raised in the campaign.
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I used did an excellent job of bringing a political perspective to bear
on the issues it covered, it was too far removed from what I wanted
to do in the course.29 Therefore, in the fall semester of 1981, I taught
for the first time what was later to become my course in election law.
But I did not call it that. For many years its name was "Law and the
Political Process," because it excluded many areas of election law,
such as voting rights, and included issues such as lobbying regulation
and conflict of interest.
The course did include some materials on redistricting, and just
when I had reached those materials, a funny thing happened. The
Democrats still controlled the California legislature, but now the
governor was Democrat Jerry Brown, and the Republicans strongly
opposed the redistricting plans the Democrats were passing. One
morning over breakfast, I learned from the Los Angeles Times what
the Republican strategy would be. They had decided to circulate ref-
erendum petitions against the Democratic redistricting plans. The
referendum, much less commonly used than the initiative, is a proce-
dure by which persons objecting to a law passed by the legislature
can prevent it from going into effect by getting sufficient signatures
on a referendum petition. The law's fate is then determined by a
vote of the people at the next statewide election.
The key point, I realized as I continued to eat my breakfast, was
that the law would not go into effect until the election.3" But the
election for the referendum would be the 1982 primary election, and
there would have to be legislative districts in order for the primary to
occur. This seemed to me a worthy and timely legal problem to put
before my students during my class that afternoon.31 After assem-
bling the relevant materials, I decided to seek out the perspective of
someone familiar with the situation. I called Michael Berman, to
whom I had hardly spoken since he had assisted me on the redis-
tricting brief ten years earlier. When I put the problem to him, his
first response was, "Who asked you to call me?"
29. The book was LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES (Hans
A. Linde & George Bunn, eds., 1976). At least one subsequent edition was
published, with additional co-editors.
30. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a).
31. The California Supreme Court's resolution of this dilemma is contained
in Assembly v. Deubnejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 639 P.2d 939, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1982).
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After I convinced Berman that I was the only person he knew
who would be capable of putting such a question to him out of mere
curiosity and without an ulterior motive, he gave an answer demon-
strating that he had already thought through the issue several steps
further than I had. At the end of the conversation, he asked if it
would be compatible with my job at UCLA to do some consulting on
the legal issues of redistricting that were surely going to arise. To
employ another movie clichd, this was the beginning of a long and
beautiful friendship. The California districting litigation that decade
lasted until 1989.3 I drew extensively on my experience in that liti-
gation in both teaching and scholarship.33 Redistricting issues be-
came a larger part of my course, and voting rights and other repre-
sentational questions soon followed. Eventually, there was no time
to include matters such as lobbying and conflict of interest, and I
changed the name of the course to "Election Law."
As readers familiar with my published works both know, a
somewhat quirky interest that I have picked up is the law of bribery
as it applies to political situations. Bribery, as the most paradigmatic
form of corruption, is obviously related to some of the issues in cam-
paign finance as well as conflict of interest, but when I began to look
at the subject, I found that no legal scholars had studied the concep-
tual issues underlying it.
I often say that my general lack of practicality is demonstrated
by the fact that I first became interested in bribery after leaving pub-
lic office. Actually, that is a slight exaggeration, because I was still
serving my final days as chairman of the FPPC when I went for my
first extensive interview after having plunged into the law school
teaching market. The interview was at the University of Chicago and
included a mandatory oral presentation to the law school faculty.
The presentation I prepared was on Buckley, and I was about a
quarter-hour into it when a questioner posed a hypothetical. I
responded that the problem raised by the hypothetical would be bet-
ter dealt with under the law of bribery than by a campaign finance
32. See Badham v. Eu, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
33. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for
Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1985). My co-author, Jonathan Steinberg, was the lead attorney in the
litigation on which I worked as a consultant throughout the decade.
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regulation. The questioner objected that the transaction in the hypo-
thetical could not be a bribe, because it involved a campaign contri-
bution. I responded that there was no reason why a campaign contri-
bution could not be a bribe if the other elements of bribery were
present. Another questioner then jumped in and repeated the objec-
tion. I elaborated on my point that I believed a campaign contribu-
tion was just as capable of being a bribe as any other gift. Yet an-
other questioner objected that the activity involved was just politics
and therefore could not be a bribe. And so on. -
After ten or fifteen minutes of this I suggested that no one in the
room, myself included, had any detailed knowledge of the law of
bribery. We could, if we wished, look up the law and find out
whether campaign contributions can be bribes. 34 But I suggested,
since we appeared to be going around in circles on the conceptual is-
sues involved, I might as well proceed. Nevertheless, the Chicago
law faculty kept me on that single question for the entire time of the
presentation and on into many of the small group interviews that
followed. Whether or not their interviewing technique was well
adapted to its ostensible purpose of evaluating a job candidate, the
incident certainly impressed itself on my memory.
A few years later, a UCLA law librarian gave me a quick lesson
in the then-new electronic database for legal research. After the les-
son, I was left alone with the computer to doodle around with what-
ever struck my fancy. What struck my fancy was the University of
Chicago interview, and I typed in something like <"brib!" AND
("politic!" OR "elect!")>. This search turned up a substantial but
manageable number of cases, some of which were completely irrele-
vant or uninteresting, but others of which posed fascinating prob-
lems. When I had some time, I followed this up with some more
systematic research, and selected a few of the most perplexing cases
I found for distribution to my students in that year's "Law and the
Political Process" course. The result was two of the liveliest and
most interesting class discussions I had had to date at UCLA.
Bribery and corruption became a recurring portion of my teaching
and scholarship.
34. As it happens, I was correct. For documentation, see Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32
UCLA L. REv. 784, 808-09 nn.86-90 and accompanying text (1985).
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That will do for a few autobiographical fragments for an essay
of this sort. These reminiscences can hardly have been of much in-
terest to most readers. Perhaps there is consolation in the thought
that anything less personal I might have written would have been less
interesting still.
At any rate, I promised a moral.35 The moral is that to an im-
pressive extent, my interest in election law and the content of the
subject as I have perceived it and taught it, has been the result of ac-
cident. The opportunity to work for Jerry Brown seemed interesting
and came along at a moment when I was looking to change jobs.
There was not much else to do at the time other than political reform,
so I did political reform. I got my initial exposure to redistricting be-
cause of a deal that I had nothing to do with between Brown and a
couple of legislators. I was able to play a major role in drafting the
California Political Reform Act because of a deal I put together after
it fell into my lap. I decided to accept the chairmanship of the FPPC
despite and not because of the fact that doing so would require me to
continue working on the same subject matter. My initial exposure to
the fascinating puzzles of bribery and corruption had frivolous
causes.
It has not all been accidental. I admit that at times I have actu-
ally engaged in reflective deliberation over what to include in my
courses and in my casebook. As I argued at the beginning of this es-
say, the explanation for the recent rise of election law as a subject is
a function of two variables, the legal developments that have actually
occurred out there, and the evolving interests and styles of legal aca-
demics and political scientists. I am not immune to the first, and
would not want to be.
But I am glad that the invitation to participate in this symposium
has led me to the realization of how much of my professional interest
has been determined by accident. I am skeptical of the style of legal
thought that consists of deriving conclusions from general premises.
I believe we are born into a rich, messy world and that we can never
formulate a manageable set of general premises that will come close
to taking account of all the relevant considerations, even in a field as
specialized as election law. I believe we muddle through and should
35. See supra, note 16.
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be satisfied if we end up causing more good than harm. I am glad
that to a large extent my professional career has matched my anti-
theoretical theoretical views.
36
36. Bruce Cain asserted flatly the other day that I was incapable of writing
anything with less than 50 footnotes. Once again, I have proven him wrong.
Cf Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Com-
ments on Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. CIE. LEGAL F. 163, 174-85 (1995) (prov-
ing Cain wrong).
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APPENDIX
I. Subject headings in Frederick C. Brightly, A Collection of
Leading Cases in the Law of Elections
in the United States (1871)
What Questions May Be Submitted to a Popular Vote
States' Rights to Regulate the Elective Franchise
Constitutional Rights of Electors
Registry Laws
Federal Qualifications
Disfranchisement
Test-oaths
Naturalization
Residence
Payment of Taxes
Validity of a Minority Election
Disqualification for Office
Majority for Disqualified Person
Proof of Qualification
Liability for Rejecting the Vote of a Qualified Elector
Right of Interested Parties to Vote
Place of Voting
Election Districts
Place of Holding Elections
Form of Tickets
Qualification of Election Officers
Election Officers de facto
Privileges of Electors
Proxies
Majorities
Duties of Return Judges or Canvassers
Returns
Effect of Certificate
Requisites of a Petition to Contest an Election
Amendment of Petition
Striking out Specifications
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Issue, and Recounting of Votes
Competency of Witnesses
Election Papers
Evidence in Contested Election Cases
Evidence-Rebutting Testimony
Irregularities Will not Vitiate the Poll
Powers of the Courts
Acquisition of Domicil
Purging the Polls
Rejection of Polls
Limitation
Division of Election District
Decision at the Next Term
Discontinuance
Appellate Jurisdiction
Rehearing
Effect of Commission
Failure to Elect
Compensation of Election Officers
Congressional Legislation
Fees of Office Pending a Contest
Influencing Elections
Injunctions
Mandamus to Elect
Organization of Municipal Legislative Bodies
Ouster
Quo Warranto
Term of Office
Vacancy in Office
Elections to Fill Vacancies
Election of Judges
Criminal Prosecutions for Illegal Voting
Requisites of Indictment for Illegal Voting
Indictments Against Election Officers
Wagers upon Elections
Appendix (Cumulative Voting)
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H. Chapter titles in Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Election Law: Cases
and Materials (1995)
1. Introductory Readings
2. The Right to Vote and Its Exercise
3. Voting and Representation
4. Legislative Districting
5. Minority Vote Dilution
6. Ballot Propositions
7. Major Political Parties
8. Third Parties and Independent Candidates
9. Bribery
10. Perspectives on Campaign Finance
11. Contribution and Expenditure Limits
12. Money and Ballot Propositions
13. Targeted Regulations: Corporations, Unions, PACs, Lob-
byists
14. Corporations and the "New Corruption"
15. Incumbency
16. Public Financing and Beyond
III. Chapter titles in Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan &
Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of
the Political Process (1998)
1. An Introduction to the Selection of Democratic Institutions
2. The Right to Participate
3. The Reapportionment Revolution
4. The Role of Political Parties
5. Preclearance and the Voting Rights Act
6. Majority Rule and Minority Vote Dilution: Constitutional
and Legislative Approaches
7. Racial Vote Dilution Under the Voting Rights Act
8. Redistricting and Representation
9. Money and Politics
10. Direct Democracy
11. Alternative Democratic Structures
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